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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH IN THE
Case

INTEREST OF
ARTHUR

J.

No. 10745

KRUMS

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is a child custody dispute.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried before E. F. Ziegler, Juvenile
Court Judge. Court held that the child should remain
in the custody of the mother and that visitation rights

of the father should be reduced.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks custody of the child by reversal of
lower Court Order.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of a divorce action which was
filed in October 1962, in which the mother was the plaintiff and the father was the defendant. After a number
of orders to show cause the Court, John F. Wahlquist,
awarded temporary custody to the father pending the
trial. Trial was held on May 8, 1963, and the Court
granted custody to the mother but provided that the
father should have the child on week-ends and for six
weeks in the summer time. Other orders to show cause
were held at the instance of both parties. The father
paid $25.00 per month alimony until June 1966, and
$60.00 per month child support. Their was never any
question about being current in the payments. The
Court made a further proviso that the child was not to
be removed from the jurisdiction without specific permission from the Court. This proviso arose out of testimony at the trial that on an earlier occasion the mother
had taken the child to Germany and had refused to return. In June 1966, the mother applied to the Court for
an order allowing her to take the child to her home in
Germany. The Court granted permission, and when the
boy was notified, he ran away from his mother's home
and walked some two and a half miles to his father's
home and asked his father to hide him so he would not
have to go to Germany. Another Order to Show Cause
was held at which time the child expressed a desire to
remain with his father and not go to Germany with the
mother. On July 18, 1966, the child turned ten years
of age and told the judge he wanted to make his choice.
The District Court then transferred the matter to the
Juvenile Court and ordered the child into the protective
custody of the Welfare Department.
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The Juvenile Court held two hearings and finally
ordered the child restored to the custody of the mother
and restricted the father's rights of visitation with the
child, keeping the child subject to the protective supervision of the Welfare Department.
From this the father appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO GIVE CONSIDERATION AND WEIGHT TO
THE CLEAR EXPRESSION OF PREFERENCE OF
THE CHILD IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATION
AS TO CUSTODY.
The courts of this state have long recognized the
doctrine that when a child reaches an age when he is
capable of making rational and intelligent judgments and
decisions, his decision and preference as to which of his
parents he wants to live with, after the parents are separated, will be given great weight and consideration in
the determination of who will maintain custody of the
child. As stated by the Court in Wallick v. Vance, 76
Utah 209, 289, Pac 103, 111 0930):
"In reaching the question as to what will best subserve the interest and happiness of a minor child,
its own choice may be consulted and given weight
if it be of an age and capacity to form a rational
judgment."
There is ample evidence in this case to indicate the
high degree of intelligence of the child, as well as his
ability to recognize the reality of his "life situation" (T.
2, and p. 7 in the Social File). Coupled with this is the
fact that there was no finding of fact or conclusion of
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law that the boy's preference was irrational or incapable
of the Court's recognition. The boy, being ten years old,
had a right to have a preference as to his parents, and
in view of his mental development (T.9), was entitled
to have his stated preference considered.
In this case, we have the situation where the custody of the child could have been placed with either parent, as evidenced by the testimony of Mrs. Dale, Miss
Bevan and the findings of facts of the Court. (Social File,
p. 4: "It is difficult to decide which is best [either the
father or mother] for this boy looking at the situation
from all sides," and p. 6, 8, 27.) In fact, the evidence
indicates that neither parents could come close to being
classed as an unfit or improper person (R. 7, 35, 37, 53).
With such equality existing as to either parent, the Court
is forced to look elsewhere for guidance as to its decision.
What more important and influential factor to look to
than the stated preference of the child, based on his recognized ability to recognize what the situation is and to
make an intelligent judgment as to its resolution?
Yet, such was not the case. The lower Court disregarded the repeated expressions of choice by the child
(T. 6, 26, 34, 38, 40, Social File p. 5), and did so not
only contrary to the present Utah case law, but also
against the unequivocal expression by the legislature that
in such cases, the child's preference must be recognized
( 30-3-5 30-3-10 Utah Code Annotated 1953).
In the recent case of Smith vs. Smith ( 15 Ut. 2d 36,
386, P. 2d 900 0 963), the children of parents engaged
in divorce proceedings, indicated that they desired to stay
with their father. This Court, on appeal, stated on page
37, that before the preference of the children can be ig4

nored by the Court, there must be a " ... finding that
the parents selected be an immoral or unfit person; otherwise the child must be awarded to the parent chosen."
It is true that that case involved a custody proceeding
concurrent with the divorce. That is not the case here,
for here there exists a time lag between the divorce and
the custody hearing. But it is submitted that this time
lag does not bar the same consideration. Appellant does
not argue that the child of the so-called "tender ages" be
placed somewhere else than with its fit mother, but once
the child reaches the age the legislature has deemed sufficient for a child to have a recognizable preference, deference should be given to this preference.
The legislature has recognized this principle both as
to divorces and to all other cases of separation, in Utah
Code Annotated, 30-3-5 and 30-3-10 0953). The pertinent language is:
". . . provided, that if any of such children have
attained the age of ten years and are of sound mind,
they shall have the privilege of selecting the parent
to which they will attach themselves ... "
This language is the same for both of the abovequoted sections of the Code. The boy, Arthur, clearly was
of sound mind and just as clearly, made known his choice
as to which parent he wished to attach himself. But the
Court disregarded this clear mandate, and acted contrary
to the evidence and to the will of the legislature and also
to the prior decree of the Supreme Court.
The Smith case, supra, clearly lays down the policy
that if the child is of the statutory age, and is found to
be capable of making an intelligent choice, then the
Court must bow to the statute and the child's preference.
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As Justice Henriod stated at page 47, if the father is found
to be a fit and proper person, "this Court has nothing to
do but apply the statute, which clearly gives the child his
choice in such case. Otherwise, we would flout the statute and indulge ourselves the luxury of judicial legislation." Justice Wade seems to make the awarding of the
child mandatory by his language on page 37: "This requires a finding that the parent selected be an immoral
or unfit person; otherwise, the child must be awarded to
the parent chosen." (Italics added.) In this case the
father is equally fit with the mother (T. 37 and 35>, is
capable of keeping a good home for the child (Social File
p. 2>. The father is not unfit (T. 53, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, Social File p. 27). Therefore
the child should have been awarded to the father.

If the legislature intended that the Court retain jurisdiction to make "such subsequent changes or new orders ... with respect to the disposal of the children ...
as shall be reasonable and proper," (Utah Code Annotated supra) then the legislature must also have intended
that any child not yet ten could make an election at age
ten. No one could say that a child who is nine years
eight months old should be prohibited forever from making an election by the mere fact that at the time the
Court entered the decree he was four months too young.
The effect of such a law is to give justice to some but not
to all. Just as no judge should have" ... the awful power to
force (one kid) to live with one of the recalcitrants against
their express wishes, (where the two homebreakers, nonetheless, are found to be equally fit to raise their children
according to the latter's choice of parents)" supra p. 49,
so also no child who at age eight wants to go with his
father and finally at age ten is able to intelligently choose

6

rI
and with full realization of his life situation chooses his
fat her should be forced against his wishes to live with his
mother and even be denied the former rights of visitation.
The child was even somewhat reluctant to visit with the
mother while in the foster home (T. 33).
It is the contention of the appellant that the legislature fully intended to allow the child, any child, when
he reached ten years of age to ... "reverse the situation,
have a choice as to his future, and say that although there
be a plague on both your houses, I want to live in the one
in which I want to live" (supra p. 49).

POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
THE FATHER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE
ALL OF THE WITNESSES AND ALSO ERRED IN
DENYING THE RIGHT TO SEE THE MATERIALS
PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY THE PSYCHOLOGIST.
In this case the Court specifically found that the
child was on the verge of a major emotional problem but
denied the father the right to cross-examine the Psychologist who had examined the boy <T. 23) and his mother.
The Court also denied the father and his counsel the
right to review the materials presented by th Psychologist <T. 48). This is error. In Caruso vs. Supreme Court,
2 Arizona App. 134, 406 p. 2 852 <1965), the Arizona
Court held that the use of materials not presented to
counsel or to the petitioners should not have been used
by the Court because counsel and petitioner had no right
to cross-examine the person who prepared the report.
Again in Thompson vs. Thompson (55NW2 329) the
Minn. Court precluded the use of evidence of the Psy7

chiatrist and others who were not available for cross.
examination.
Appellant does not deny the need of the courts to
such specialized information, nor does he argue that a
degree of informality should not be present in such proceedings. What appellant docs contend is that when the
permanent loss of his son is at issue, procedural safeguards to protect the father, the boy and the mother of
necessity exist. See In Re Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 NW
2 308 0954). As stated by the Court in the Thompson
case, supra at 332:
"We believe that the rule should be, when there
has been no waiver of the right, that an order ... to
change the custody of children should be based upon a
hearing in which witnesses may be cross-examined ...
no one would contend that such parent could be deprived
the right to cross examine the witnesses upon whose testimony the Court was to base its findings."
Such is the case at hand due to the equality of the
respective parent's situations (T. 35, 37). The Psychologist's reports as to both the mother and the boy gained
increased importance. That the lower Court recognized '
this importance and placed substantial reliance thereon
is apparent from the record <T. 41, 48, 51-53). In fact
the Court goes so far as to weigh these reports against '
the father's failure to be likewise tested (T. 53). Yet at
no time did the Court suggest bringing the examiner, Dr.
Swaner, in for cross examination, nor did he release the '
report to appellant. This Court, as long ago as 1907,
stated in the case of Will vs. Brown 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac.
3609, that one of the legal requirements for removing the

8

custody of a child from its parent is that of examining the
witnesses, including "the right of cross-examination."
This case is not concerned with the dependency or
neglect of the child. The issue is solely that of which of
two natural parents, equally fit, should assume the custody of the boy. To inject the Psychological Report with
a favorable recommendation for the mother (Social File
p. 14) into such a balance, without releasing the same to
the father or his counsel and without the benefits of examining the witness was to prejudice the father's case and
doom his attempt to failure.
This type of "back door" evidence has been and
should be banned from this type of hearings. "This
method of acepting evidence <Psychiatric Report) with
no opportunity to cross examine was clearly improper ... "
ln Re Dulay, 265 NYS 2 247, 24 A 2 208 0965>.
POINT 3. TH COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF MRS. MARILYN
DALE AND MISS SHARON BEVAN THAT THE
CHILD SHOULD REMAIN WITH THE MOTHER.
The testimony of both Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan
was to the effect that it would make no difference to
which parent the child would be awarded since both parents were equally fit <Social File p. 4, 5, 6, and 9, T. p.
4, 5, 37). Yet both Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan finally
made the recommendation that the child should remain
with the mother. These recommendations arise out of
visits in the home of the father, when Mrs. Dale stated
~he was unable to communicate with the father <Social
File p. 2, T. p. 7), yet Mrs. Dale was able to arrive at
thl conclusion that the father downgraded the mother,
cmd said the mother "does not take proper care of the
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boy emotionally or physically"
is demonstrated by the fact that
care, custody and control of the
dering on a complete breakdown

(which emotional care
the boy has been in the
mother and is now bor<Order p. 6 Social File).

Both Mrs. Dale and Miss Bevan, trained in social
work and relied upon greatly by the Court, ignore the
obvious fact that the child's emotional problems which
now present themselves as "bordering on a complete
breakdown" stem from his constant association with the
mother. The occasional visit with the father rather is
branded as the apparent cause of the child's problem.
This transferrance of female logic is not to be countenanced. Rather than follow her own statement that the
mother is "very bitter toward Mr. Krums" (Social File
p. 2) and "the mother is very bitter towards the father,
and I wonder how she handles this with the boy in terms
of what his feelings are towards the father" (Social File
p. 3). Mrs. Dale suggests three courses of action (Social
File p. 4): (1.) Boy's placement with the father, (2.l
Boy's placement with the mother, (3.) Boy's placement
in foster care. Mrs. Dale then says: "It is difficult to
decide which is best for this boy, looking at the situation
from all sides." Without explanation she then states her
feelings. Are we now reduced to accepting the recommendation of a woman who ignores the logic (a) that the
boy wants to go with his father, (b) the father is able to
care for him, (c) the father is fit to care for him and (d)
the boy is now emotionally ill from long association with
a "very bitter," "depressed" mother? The only conclusion which reasonable men could arrive at would be that
if the mother makes this boy sick, let the father try to
help the boy.
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Miss Bevan suggests that the boy's feelings are
stronger towards the father, and she then attempts to
reason why the child would so feel. In her report she
states that both parents seem to love the child (T. p. 35)
and yet she says that the child would rather go to the
father for what he can get from the father. She reports
that the child seemed to be afraid he would be punished
if he went to visit his mother and that this was the reason he seemed to want to choose his father rather than
the mother. This reasoning does not follow. This child
docs not appear to be so sophisticated as to be able to
follow Miss Bevan's line of reasoning, or to lead the reasoning to the conclusion finally reached.
CONCLUSION
The Utah law is well established that a child who
is ten at the time of the granting of the divorce or at the
time of the separation may make an election and that if
the: parent selected is fit and proper person the Court is
bound by the election. <Smith vs. Smith, supra, 30-3-5
3-3-10 USC 1953). If the law applies to a ten-year-old
at the time of the divorce or separation then it should
apply at any time when the question of custody is before
the Court and the child is of the statutory age. In this
case the child clearly selected the father on every occasion he was asked. The Court, after stating that there
was no difference between the parents insofar as fitness
for the care of the child was concerned, ignored the stated
preference of the child and ordered the child to go with
the mother and then warned that if the child disobeyed
the order of the Court by running away the consequences
would be dire. The clear implication being that the feelings of the child, the desires of the child, the wishes of
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the child are of no consequence in the deciding of this
case, rather the "feelings" of two women, one a Mrs. and
the other a Miss, are the basis for the Court's decision.
To allow the obvious intent of the legislature to be subverted to the "feelings" of Court personnel who in their
reports to the Court relate no difference in the relative
ability of the parents and who relate again and again that
the child prefers to go with his father and who arrive at
a recommendation that the father be cut out of the boy's
life is to make a mockery of the law. The law is clear and
well stated that the child should be allowed to choose,
to ignore the choice when it is made is to echo the statement by Mr. Justice Holmes, " ... the law is a ass"!
Respectfully submitted,

C. DEMONT JUDD, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
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